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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: A VIEW
FROM A FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST
Robert L. Sadoff, M.D. *
Therapeutic jurisprudence appears to be a revolutionary new
and progressive concept in the law, eschewing the traditional
principle of precedent. Professor David Wexler has introduced this
concept initially in terms of mental health law;' it has been expanded
to include civil law and personal injury matters as well as criminal
cases.
2
It is certainly clear to consider the application of mental health
law wherein the consumer or patient becomes the focus of therapeutic
attention. Is the decision made in keeping with the patient's best
interest? Does the patient have autonomy in this particular case or
is the patient the product of the paternalistic mental health system?
The whole area of patients' rights, including right to treatment and
right to refuse treatment, focuses on the welfare of the patient in
terms of legal rights rather than medical needs.' Some critics have
complained that the law has gone too far in granting patients the right
to refuse treatment when courts have already declared that patients
have a right to adequate treatment if they are involuntarily confined
to mental hospitals.' Other cases have proclaimed the professional
C Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine.
iDavid B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 3, 4 (David B. Wexler ed.,
1990).
2 See Robert F. Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due
Care: Psychotherapists and Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, in ESSAYS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 157 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991)
[hereinafter ESSAYS].
' Qf BruceJ. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between
Assent and Objection, in ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 41, 50 (discussing policy concerns
in determining the appropriate level of ability required of patients to be competent to
make treatment decisions).
" See Rael J. Isaac & Samuel J. Braken, Subverting Good Intentions: A Brief History
of Mental Health Law 'Reform", 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL. 89, 108 (1992) (stating
it would be incongruous if an individual could frustrate the very reason for the state's
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judgment of the therapists as the central focus when deciding
treatment issues.'
With respect to involuntary commitment, the law has changed
in every state to include "dangerousness" as one of the major criteria
for commitment.6 It is not sufficient for an individual to be deprived
of rights by being committed solely because the person is mentally ill
and in need of hospital treatment. The person must pose a risk of
harm to self or others as a result of mental illness in order for the
courts to sanction a deprivation of liberty.7
Mental health professionals have always maintained that
voluntary hospitalization, when available, is preferable to involuntary
commitment for treatment of the mentally ill.' The United States
Supreme Court case of Zinermon v. Birch held that incompetent
patients may not be voluntarily admitted to hospitals for treatment.9
They must be involuntarily committed if they meet the requirements
of mental illness and dangerousness, or they must be given alternative
treatment."° Suppose that the patient is incompetent to sign into the
hospital and yet does not meet the criteria for involuntary
commitment? What are the treatment options? Must the patient go
untreated? Can a compromise be found? Many psychiatrists are still
not familiar with this case and continue to hospitalize severely
mentally ill patients who agree to voluntary hospitalization.
action by refusing treatment); see also Delila M.J. Ledwith, Jones v. Gerhardstein: The
Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refise Treatment With Psychotropic
Drugs, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1367 (1990) (discussing the controversy between the legal
and medical communities over treatment refusal by mentally ill patients in light of the
impact of the Jones decision on institutional practice and on refusing patients).
' See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992); Tran Van Khiem v. United
States, 612 A.2d 160, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hospital, 827
F.2d 291,300 (8th Cir. 1987); Johnsonv. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1984).
6 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 728 (1972). See also Gilliam v. Martin,
589 F. Supp. 680, 682 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding forcible medication constitutional
when clear indication that petitioner will revert to dangerous and psychotic behavior).
7 See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 134 (1990) (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)).
' See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment. The Distinction
Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REv 15, 50 (1991).
9 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
10 Id. at 133.
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Professor Bruce Winick has specifically criticized the
Zinermon case as not being therapeutic for the patient while giving
the patient the legally logical right to be competent before signing
into the hospital as a voluntary admission." He points to the fact that
many people are so sorely in need of hospitalization and would
benefit from voluntary hospitalization if they were allowed to sign in
even though they are severely mentally ill and likely incompetent. 2
Voluntary hospitalization has been shown to be more effective
therapeutically than involuntary commitment." Nevertheless, the
legal rights of the patient have to be upheld and the patient may not
be admitted on his/her own signature if the patient is incompetent.14
When leaving the area of mental health law and entering the
arena of civil and criminal law, many other controversial cases are
noted to be antitherapeutic rather than adhering to the concepts of
therapeutic jurisprudence." Especially in the area of domestic
relations law, children are often harmed by the system that is
designed to protect them. 6 Recently, guardians have been appointed
to represent the best interests of the children; 7 however, traditionally
(and continuing in many jurisdictions), it is the rights of the parents,
battling for custody in a bitter dispute, that are recognized, often at
" Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L. J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 169, 172 (1991).
12 Id.
'i Id. at 192-95.
"Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 135.
1 See, e.g., David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a
New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy, Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 979, 996 n.57 (1991) (criticizing the Court's decision in Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399 (1986), that incompetent death row inmates have their executions suspended,
as encouraging psychological dysfunction).
36 See generally Douglas J. Besharov, State Intervention to Protect Children: New
York's Definition of "Child Abuse" and "Child Neglect", 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 723
(1981) (arguing that over-intervention by the state places too many children in foster care
for too long a period of time).
'7 Elizabeth A. Sammann, The Reality of Family Preservation Under Norman v.
Johnson, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 706 n.251 (1992).
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the expense of the rights of the children." s Only recently did a case
develop in which a child was allowed to divorce his parents, to free
himself of their control in order to be adopted by a family that
provided a more therapeutic environment for him.19
In the field of civil law, especially personal injury, a number
of plaintiffs have not been given sufficient information about the
effects of litigation on their well-being.2" Many plaintiffs complain
that, had they known how difficult the litigation would be, how much
of an invasion of their privacy and how time-consuming and probing
the process is, they would have chosen not to sue in the first place.
Can something be done to modify the procedures so that the plaintiffs
(and, in some cases, defendants) are not subject to the antitherapeutic
zeal of the current system of interrogatories, depositions, and
invasions of privacy?
In criminal cases, efforts have been made to modify the
traditional law in terms of providing psychiatric assessment for those
in need21 and expanding the areas in which psychiatric and mental
health assessments are allowed (e.g., heat of passion, voluntary
intoxication, battered spouse syndrome, post-traumatic stress
disorder).22 Efforts are made at tailoring the sentence to the needs of
the convicted. 3 Therapy is recommended for those individuals who
have significant emotional or mental disorders that have been a part
'8 See generally Melissa D. Philbrick, Agreements to Arbitrate Post-Divorce Custody,
18 COLuM. J.L. & SoC. PROBs. 419, 419 (1985) (goal of custody dispute should be to
protect the child's interests).
"' See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming
in part termination of parental rights but reversing in part and remanding case for
resolution of procedural deficiency).
2 See generally JEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRiAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME
(1987) (examining the problems with personal injury litigation).
21 See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (recognizing an expanded role
of mental-health professionals in capital cases).
' See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 386 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Ga. 1989) (holding evidence
of battered wife syndrome in homicide case is admissible); State v. Allewalt, 517 A.2d
741 (Md. 1986) (stating general testimony regarding post-traumatic stress syndrome is
admissible).
' David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Introduction to ESSAYS, supra note 2 at ix,
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of their criminal history.' There are special programs for the
treatment of gambling addicts, drug and alcohol abusers, sex
offenders, and mentally ill or psychotic individuals.'
What about treatment for individuals confined to correctional
institutions? Can effective therapy be conducted in a primarily
punitive or security-conscious environment rather than a therapeutic
environment such as a hospital? Can one have effective treatment in
an environment where the therapist has limited confidentiality and
must report to the authorities when the patient threatens to harm
himself or others or to escape or, in some way, to jeopardize the
tranquility of the secure institution? Therapy is conducted in such an
environment and may be effective within the concept of limited
confidentiality.26 As long as individuals are told in advance what they
can expect and what the limits on confidentiality are, they can work
within those parameters. However, the treatment offered in
corrections or on probation is often very sporadic and ineffective
with little or no follow-up.
27
One result of this lack of treatment is illustrated by a recent,
well-publicized release of a mentally ill criminal. Donald Chapman
of Wyckoff, New Jersey2 was sentenced to serve 10 to 20 years for
' See generally Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates With Mental Disorders: A
Guide to Law and Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 462 (1992)
(prisoners with psychological problems should seek therapy).
'5 E.g., David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL L. REP. 229, 229-30
(1992).
' David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS, supra
note 2, at 24.
' Connie Mayer, Survey of Case Law Establishing Constitutional Minima for the
Provision of Mental Health Services to Psychiatrically Involved Inmates, 15 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRiM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 243, 258 (1989); Lois G. Forer, The Prisoner and
the Psychiatrist, 31 EMORY L. J. 61, 61 (1982); Daniel Golden, Sex-cons, BOSTON
GLOBE MAGAZINE, Apr. 4, 1993, at 12; Bill Sanderson, Prisoners of Their Own Minds:
Inmate Mental-Health Care Criticized, RECORD (NORTHERN NJ), Aug. 22, 1993 at Al;
Ruth Bonapace, Storm Clouds Are Building At Prison for Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1993, 13NJ at 1.
28 Mary Jo Layton, Rapist Will Be Committed, Judge: Chapman Danger to Society,
RECORD (NORTHERN NJ), Feb. 20, 1993, at Al.
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aggravated sexual assault29 at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment
Center at Avenel, New Jersey's prison for sex offenders."0 Donald
Chapman's maximum sentence was reduced to twelve years because
of good time and work time." Once Chapman had completed the
maximum sentence he had to be released.3 2 Upon his release, county
officials began an around-the-clock surveillance of Chapman."3 The
surveillance was undertaken because it was reported that Chapman
had not improved during the twelve years he spent, at Avenel.
4
While maintaining the surveillance, the State Attorney General's
office worked to obtain a court order to confine Chapman for
psychiatric testing.3 5 The Attorney General's office prevailed and
Chapman was sent to Bergen Pines Hospital in Paramus for testing.
3 6
There were, of course, disputes as to Chapman's condition
between experts who examined him. 7 During his twelve years at
Avenel, Donald Chapman's behavior was "without incident."" The
doctors at Avenel determined that Chapman was not mentally ill.39
To order Chapman's commitment, the state was required to prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that Chapman was mentally ill and
29 State v. Chapman, 472 A.2d 559 (N.J. 1984); Jim Consoli & Seamus McGraw,
County Won't Probe Freed Rapist's Claims Statute of Limitations Protects Him, RECORD
(NORTHERN N.J.), Dec. 21, 1992 at Al.
30 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2c:47-1 (West 1992); Bonapace, supra note 27.
31 Tracy Schroth, Should Punishment Precede the Crime, N.J.L.J., Jan. 11, 1993 at
1.
32 David Glovin, Chapman Likely to Get Doctors' OK: Attorney General Will Fight
to Keep Rapist Hospitalized, RECORD (NORTHERN N.J.), Jun. 4, 1993 at Al.
33 Id.
I Kay Jackson, a psychologist at Avenel, was so concerned about Chapman's release
that she contacted police and advised them that Chapman "entertained continuing
fantasies of sexual torture and mutilation of women" and that he "intended to commit
another sex crime." Schroth, supra note 31. Chapman's lawyer conceded that whatever
therapy Chapman had received in prison "did not work." Malcolm Gladwell, A Small
Town Lives in Dread That Freed Rapist 'Could Snap' Again, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1993
at A3.
11 David Glovin, Lawyer: Hospital Ignoring Rapist Says Chapman's Going
Untreated, RECORD (NORTHERN N.J.), Mar. 11, 1993 at B1.
m Id.
371d.
3 Layton, supra note 28.
391d.
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poses a danger to himself or others.' John LaFond, a professor at
the University of Puget Sound School of Law, reports that "most sex
offenders are not mentally ill."41  Professor LaFond stated that
"sexually violent predators generally have antisocial personality
features" and that they are often not responsive to mental health
treatment.42 Chapman was, however, following a series of closed
hearings held at Bergen Pines, found to be "mentally ill as defined by
statute" 43 and a danger to society." The State Division of Mental
Health and Hospitals ordered Chapman held at the Forensic
Psychiatric Hospital in Trenton, a maximum security facility for
prisoners needing psychiatric help and for defendants found not guilty
of crimes by reason of insanity."
What should be done with an individual like Donald Chapman
who becomes a medical-legal quandary and has implications for
mental health law and questions for therapeutic jurisprudence." The
question remains whether Chapman's detention was preventive
detention or whether this was an appropriate use of mental health law
in order to prevent violent behavior and offer further treatment to this
individual.47 Would the State have acted similarly if this were a man
who committed an aggravated assault in the course of robbery and
served his maximum sentence? 48 Would the State have attempted to
o Glovin, supra note 35.
41 Professor LaFond wrote the ACLU's amicus brief in support of a Washington
State Supreme Court challenge to the state's sex offender law, In re Young, 857 P.2d
989 (Wash. 1993), claiming that the purpose of the commitment is lifetime preventive
detention not treatment which is blatantly unconstitutional. Schroth, supra note 31.
42 Id.
' In New Jersey, "[bly law, patients must be overtly psychotic before they can be
committed." Schroth, supra note 31.
4Layton, supra note 28.
4S Glovin, supra note 32.
6 "See generally Elyce H. Zenoff, Symposium on the ABA Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards: Controlling the Dangers of Dangerousness: The ABA Standards and
Beyond, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 562 (1985) (evaluating recommendations regarding
future offenders and balance between crime prevention and individual autonomy).
' The Supreme Court has held that the "government's regulatory interest in
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty
interest." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987); Schroth, supra note 31;
Glovin, supra note 32.
' Gladwell, supra note 34.
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have this man committed even though he had said that he was going
to attack others and would commit further robberies after he served
his maximum sentence and was discharged from the prison system?
Is there a bias against the sex offender or others who have
questionable mental illness, such that the community can act to detain
them in involuntary hospitalization?49
Within criminal law, perhaps the most important therapeutic
decision was in the case of Jackson v. Indiana.° In that case, the
Supreme Court said that the State could not "constitutionally commit"
a defendant for an indefinite period simply on account of "his
incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed against him. "It The
Court held that an individual charged with a criminal offense who is
committed solely due to his incompetency to stand trial "cannot be
held more than a reasonable period of time necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that
capacity in the foreseeable future. ,52 If it is determined that it the
individual will not attain the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable
future, "the State must either institute the customary civil
commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely
any other citizen or release the defendant."" It is very difficult to
treat an individual while he has the prospect of standing trial for
matters that may result in a life sentence or even the death penalty.'
It is not "therapeutic" to hold a person indefinitely until competency
is restored; therapy in such instances may not be very effective. 5
In a similar manner, in civil law, it is almost impossible to do
effective therapy on an individual who is a plaintiff in a personal
injury case or a malpractice suit where he raises his mental state as
I See Sean P. Murphy, Nation Getting Tougher On Its Sex Offenders, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 16, 1992, at 16.
50 406 U.S. 715 (1972)
11 Id. at 720.
'2 Id. at 738.
53 Id.
I See David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New
Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
979, 995 (1991) ("Defendants facing serious charges were thereby given an incentive to
become permanently incompetent .... ").
55 Id. at 996.
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an issue in that suit.56 If, in the course of litigation, the individual
requires treatment, all of his treatment notes are discoverable by
subpoena to the other side.57 Thus, there is no privacy of his
treatment and no effective therapy without such privacy.5 8
These are a few concerns of a forensic psychiatrist regarding
the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence. The notion is sound as long
as it is applied consistently and pursued by the courts where mentally
ill clients, defendants or plaintiffs, are involved. However, the rights
of patients and the needs of the law are not always in concert with
therapeutic principles regarding the best medical interest of the
individuals concerned.59
' A patient's introduction of the issue of his mental competency into an action is
interpreted as the waiver of the statutory privilege against disclosure of psychotherapist-
patient communications. B.W. Best, Annotation, Privilege, in Judicial or Quasi Judicial
Proceedings, Arisingfrom Relationship Between Psychiatrist or Psychologist and Patient,
44 A.L.R. 3rd 24 (1972). See Abernathy v. United States, 773 F.2d 184 (8th Cir.
1985); Florida v. Axelson, 363 N.Y.S. 2d 200 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
S7 See Friedlander v. Morales, 415 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1979).
William W. Hague, Comment, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in
Washington: Extending the Privilege to Community Mental Health Clinics, 58 WASH. L.
REv. 565, 570 (1983); Mayer supra note 27, at 274.
" Golden supra note 27; Murphy supra note 49.

